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Domestic Violence Law, Abusers’
Intent, and Social Media
HOW TRANSACTION-BOUND STATUTES ARE THE
TRUE THREATS TO PROSECUTING PERPETRATORS
OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
“Hi, I’m Tone Elonis.
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my
wife? . . .
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say.
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just
telling you that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife. . . .
Um, but what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I
really, really think someone out there should kill my wife. . . .
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.
Because that’s its own sentence. . . .
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, extremely illegal, to go
on Facebook and say something like the best place to fire a mortar
launcher at her house would be from the cornfield behind it
because of easy access to a getaway road and you’d have a clear
line of sight through the sun room. . . .
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated diagram. [diagram
of the house] . . . .”1
© Megan L. Bumb, 2017. The author has not granted rights to reprint this
article under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please
contact the author directly for reprint permission.
1 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005–06 (2015) (alteration in
original) (omissions in original) (quoting United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 333 (3d
Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)). After Anthony Douglas Elonis posted this to
Facebook, a Pennsylvania county court granted his wife a three-year protection-fromabuse order. Id.

917

918

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:2

INTRODUCTION
After almost seven years of marriage, Tara Elonis left
her husband, Anthony Elonis, removing their two young
children, in May 2010.2 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Elonis began
having problems at work, eventually getting fired for a Facebook
post he would make about a coworker.3 After these events, Mr.
Elonis changed his Facebook name to “Tone Dougie” and started
posting rap lyrics on the social media site, many about his exwife.4 Not only was Mr. Elonis Facebook “friends” with his wife’s
friends and family, but his page was public and all of his posts
were visible to the hundreds of people he was “friends” with on
Facebook and “accessible to the public at large.”5 Afraid for her
safety—like many women who experience abusive Internet
communications from intimate partners—Tara sought
assistance from the judicial system.6 But, because the presently
available statutes to prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence
are inadequate, the legal system was and is unable to do much
to protect Tara and other victims from further abuse.
In November 2010, a Pennsylvania county court granted
Tara custody of the couple’s two children and a three-year
protection-from-abuse order, the longest such order available in
the state.7 However, even after the issuance of the order, Mr.
Id. at 2004.
Elonis, 730 F.3d at 324. Mr. Elonis was fired for posting a threatening photo
about a coworker who had filed five sexual harassment charges against him. Id. The post
included a picture of Mr. Elonis holding a knife to the coworker’s neck (they worked at a
Halloween park) with the caption “I wish.” Id.
4 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
5 Brief for the United States at 2, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015) (No. 13-983).
6 See JD Malone, Anthony Elonis’ Estranged Wife Testifies About Facebook
Threats, EXPRESS-TIMES (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/bethlehem/
index.ssf/2011/10/anthony_elonis_estranged_wife.html [https://perma.cc/Q72D-RLFV].
7 Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 4. Though jurisdictions refer to
these orders by different terms, such as a “restraining order,” “protective order,” or
“order of protection,” a “protective order” is “[a] court order prohibiting or restricting a
party from engaging in conduct . . . that unduly annoys or burdens” the other party.
Protective Order, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). There are three types of
these orders of protection in New York: Family Court, Supreme Court, and Criminal
Court orders of protection. Frequently Asked Questions: Obtaining an Order of
Protection, NYCOURTS.GOV, https://www.nycourts.gov/faq/orderofprotection.shtml#q3
[https://perma.cc/2AQ9-TB9U]. A prosecutor may seek a criminal protection order on behalf
of a victim after arresting the batterer. See id. In contrast, an abuse victim may seek a civil
protection order on her own, in two stages. Orders of Protection, WOMENSLAW.ORG, http://
www.womenslaw.org/laws_state_type.php?id=561&state_code=NY [https://perma.cc/R99
H-FQMJ] (last updated Apr. 20, 2017). The first is a “temporary” or “emergency” order,
granted after an ex parte hearing, which requires no notice to the abuser but does need to
be served on him or her before the order is effective. Id. A judge will not grant a final
order until a later trial where both parties are present. See id. These orders of
protection may mandate the abuser to stay away for the victim’s home and/or
2
3
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Elonis continued to post about his ex-wife on Facebook; he even
posted about the protection-from-abuse order and what he
suggested Tara should do with it.8 It was this post in particular
that made Tara “extremely afraid for [her] life” because, in
spite of the order, he “was still making the threats for everyone
to see.”9 In response to these and other Facebook posts, including
a post about an FBI agent, the federal government began
investigating and, soon thereafter, arrested Mr. Elonis in
December 2010.10 Mr. Elonis was convicted of transmitting a
“communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of
another” in interstate commerce.11 He appealed his conviction all
the way to the Supreme Court.
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined that proving negligence alone is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction for transmitting threats through interstate
commerce; instead, the government needs to prove something
more than an objective, reasonable person standard.12 While
Justice Roberts, writing for the seven-to-two majority, asserted
that what a speaker “‘thinks’ does matter” in determining
culpability, just how much it matters remains unclear.13 With
the circuits requiring guidance as to the proper standard to use
when determining what constitutes a “true threat,” this highly
anticipated case of first impression fell far short of its potential.14
workplace, to cease any communication with the victim, and to relinquish firearms. Id.
They can also vary in length, depending on need and severity. Id.
8 Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 7; see infra note 214 and
accompanying text.
9 Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
10 Mr. Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010, after he wrote a post about
the female FBI agent who was investigating his conduct. Brief for the United States,
supra note 5, at 8–9. After she left his home, Mr. Elonis posted “Little Agent Lady
stood so close[,] [t]ook all the strength I had not to turn the bitch ghost[.] Pull my knife,
flick my wrist, and slit her throat.” Id.; see Docket, United States v. Elonis, No. 5:11-cr00013-LS (E.D. Pa. 2010).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). The second count was as follows:
On or about November 6, 2010, through on or about November 15, 2010, in
Bethlehem, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, defendant
ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS knowingly and willfully transmitted in
interstate and foreign commerce, via a computer and the Internet, a
communication to others, that is, a communication containing a threat to injure
the person of another, specifically, a threat to injure and kill T.E., a person known
to the grand jury. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).
Indictment at 2, United States v. Elonis, 5:11-cr-00013-LS (E.D. Pa. Jan. 1, 2011).
12 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–13 (2015).
13 Id. at 2011.
14 See P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threat Cases: The
Importance of Context in Analyzing Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 39, 76 (2015); Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime,
National Center for Victims of Crime Statement on Elonis v. U.S. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://
www.victimsofcrime.org/media/full-story/2014/12/01/national-center-for-victims-of-crime-
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By “say[ing] only what the law is not” rather than what the law
is,15 the Court avoided its “emphatic[ ] . . . province and duty,”16
leaving many concerned about the “confusion and serious
problems” that will result from the Court’s indecision.17
Yet Elonis will not “throw[ ] everyone from appellate
judges to everyday Facebook users into a state of uncertainty.”18
Justice Thomas, in his dissenting Elonis opinion, suggested that
lower courts can “safely infer that a majority” of the Supreme
Court does not believe the First Amendment demands an intentto-threaten finding, as the Elonis majority “carefully le[ft] open
the possibility that recklessness may be enough.”19 Although
lower courts may be able to “safely infer” some things about the
decision, they will quite certainly require further clarification
from the Supreme Court about the constitutionally mandated
standard to define the line between protected and prosecutable
speech of certain types. Communication between intimate
partners with a history of abuse—like that of Tara and Anthony
Elonis—is not one of those types.20
There is a fundamental difference between the speech of
a citizen directed at a fellow citizen or government official21 and
that of an abusive intimate partner directed at his or her
partner. Between these partners, communications may not be
protected speech at all, but an abusive act. With abuse between
statement-on-elonis-v.-u.s [https://perma.cc/EW58-X2QB]; Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme
Court Considers “True Threats” and the First Amendment, VERDICT (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/10/supreme-court-considers-true-threats-first-amendment
[https://perma.cc/9SD4-SFF7]; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Throws Out Conviction for
Violent Facebook Postings, WASH. POST (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/supreme-court-throws-out-conviction-for-violent-facebook-postings/2015/
06/01/68af3ee0-086b-11e5-a7ad-b430fc1d3f5c_story.html?utm_term=.a26b691ce786 [https://
perma.cc/K6MH-FX7E]. But see Vauhini Vara, The Nuances of Threats on Facebook,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nuances-threatfacebook [https://perma.cc/LV9C-5SRU] (referencing the predication by James
Grimmelmann, a prominent Internet law scholar, that the Court would not use the case to
expand threat standards).
15 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013 (Alito, J., dissenting).
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
17 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013 (Alito, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Barnes, supra
note 14; Catherine J. Ross, Address at the Boston University Law Review Symposium:
Why Is It So Hard to Reign in Sexually Violent Speech? (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.bu.
edu/bulawreview/ross-sexually-violent-speech/#_ftn12 [https://perma.cc/UR3R-CPVR].
18 Cf. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Further, Facebook policy already states: “We remove content, disable accounts, and
work with law enforcement when we believe there is a genuine risk of physical harm or
direct threats to public safety.” Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/communitystandards [https://perma.cc/N5MA-GKPG].
19 Elonis,135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
20 See infra Section II.C.
21 In addition to the charges for some of Mr. Elonis’ posts about his ex-wife,
the government prosecuted Mr. Elonis for posts about his coworkers and an FBI agent.
See supra notes 3, 10 and accompanying text.
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intimate partners, the abuser’s subjective intent to assert
power and control over another is a vital element of what
makes the act criminal—be that act sexual, physical, verbal, or
a threatening Facebook comment. And advocates for victims of
domestic violence should focus on removing the barriers to
prosecuting these criminal acts that presently exist.
The largest current barrier is the use of existing,
transaction-bound criminal statutes, like “battery,” “harassment,”
or “the interstate communication of a threat.”22 These statutes are
problematic because they are temporally constrained and do not
recognize the pattern of power and control central to this abuse or
capture the true harm of the behavior. This is the behavior that
conflicts with the normative values of our society, the behavior
we seek to penalize when prosecuting perpetrators of genderbased violence. While use of these existing statutes was critical
in initially recognizing domestic violence as a criminal offense,
the time has come to remove the true threat to prosecution of
perpetrators of domestic violence. That threat is not the First
Amendment, the Elonis decision, or the “established tenets of
criminal law”;23 these demand that the government must prove a
“union between act and mind” to prosecute someone for violative
speech.24 The true threat is the absence of a domestic violence
statute from the books that includes the abuser’s subjective
intent and recognizes this pattern of abuse and control.
Professor Alafair S. Burke presented a new domestic
violence statute that incorporates these contextual elements
that have been conspicuously absent from existing statutes.
The statute criminalizes “coercive domestic violence,” which
encompasses the defendant’s coercive acts and emotional abuse
that coincide with physical violence.25 She concludes her proposal
by asking whether there is enough of a reformist “wave,” one
surrounding the inadequacies of current transaction-bound
statutes, to effect the enactment of a domestic violence specific
statute.26 While she concludes that this “is a question [she is] not
able, or ready, to answer,” this note argues that such a “wave”
exists, or at least, that the reformist tide is coming in.27 Part I of
this note presents domestic violence background, research about
an abuser’s motivations, the increasing and novel problem of
22 Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 554–55, 558 n.32 (2007).
23 Id. at 598.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 601–02.
26 Id. at 612.
27 Id.
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social media threats for victims of domestic violence, and the
developments, as well as inadequacies, of existing laws that
govern domestic violence cases. Part II lays out the true threat
doctrine, explaining what constitutes a true threat and why it
is not protected speech under the First Amendment. It then
outlines the case law of the doctrine and analyzes why the
Elonis decision—despite being a missed opportunity for the
Court—was ultimately not the proper solution for prosecuting
perpetrators of domestic violence. And finally, Part III argues
that Professor Burke’s “Coercive Domestic Violence” statute is
the perfect solution to prosecuting perpetrators of domestic
violence who have threatened their victims on social media.
And the facts of Elonis function as a powerful case study to
analyze and illustrate how the statute strikes the requisite
balance between protecting the First Amendment rights of
abusers and advocating for victims of gender-based violence.
I.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: BACKGROUND, LAW, AND ISSUES
“If I only knew then what I know now . . . I would have smothered
your ass with a pillow. Dumped your body in the back seat. Dropped
you off in Toad Creak and made it look like a rape and murder.”28

Since the identification of “domestic violence” as a
societal problem and not a family matter, the understanding of
what “domestic violence” means between intimate partners has
continued to evolve; much of that evolution stems from a greater
understanding of the abuser’s intent. Before diving into the
multifaceted, pervasive29 problem that is domestic violence, it is
first necessary to establish the parameters of this note. While
there are many types of intimate partner violence, this note will
only address domestic violence between male perpetrators and
female victims due to the frequency with which this type of
domestic violence occurs.30 It will also not contemplate the
28 Posted by Anthony Douglas Elonis on Facebook. Brief for the United
States, supra note 5, at 3.
29 A survey sponsored by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in
2000 revealed that of 16,000 Americans surveyed, 65% of women who reported being
physically assaulted by an intimate partner had experienced more than one instance of
physical violence. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, at iii, 39
(2000). This survey also suggests that the average length of abuse between intimate
partners was four and a half years. Id. at 39.
30 “From 1994 to 2010, about 4 in 5 victims of intimate partner violence were
female.” SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE,
1993–2010, at 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HPZ7-NUVL]. And in 2010, there were over 900,000 reported nonfatal, violent
incidents between intimate partners. Id. at 1. Further, women living with female
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correlations between socioeconomic status, race, and domestic
violence, though these are vital components of the issue.
Additionally, the note will put aside the ethical complications
and paternalistic arguments31 that arise when women do not
want their abusers prosecuted, just one of the many prosecutorial
dilemmas that makes domestic violence the complex issue it is.
Even the term “domestic violence” itself is problematic as it
highlights only the problem’s physicality, which is merely one
aspect of the experience of abused women.32 But with a growing
understanding of an abuser’s motivations, the increasing
prevalence of social media, and the inadequacies of existing
domestic violence law, the legal landscape is ripe and ready for
the law to catch up to the science.
A.

The Early Research on and the Reformist Strategy for
Domestic Violence

Beginning in the 1970s, the awareness of domestic
violence as a pervasive societal issue helped transform the issue
from one law enforcement “at best [saw] as a nuisance to be
mediated and at worst as a dangerous situation to be avoided” to
one some courts recognize as an affirmative defense to murder.33
Much of that transformation came from scholars such as Dr.
Lenore Walker, whose works first identified what “domestic
violence” actually was.34 Early representations of domestic
violence understood it as a repetitive cycle of violence with four
distinct stages: a “tension building stage,” an acute battering
episode stage, the honeymoon/reconciliation stage, and a calm
stage, with the cycle then repeating itself.35 Similarly, much of
intimate partners experience less violence than those who live with male intimate
partners. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 29, at iv.
31 See e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on
Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1073–75 (1996)
(arguing that the autonomy of women is not furthered when states enforce marital
privileges and adverse testimony privileges); see also Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly:
Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 551, 586–96
(addressing the parallels between forcing women to prosecute their batterers against
their will with domestic violence).
32 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 65
(2000) (identifying the problems with defining the “problem”); Burke, supra note 22, at
555; see infra note 41 and accompanying text. This note will use “domestic violence,”
“gender based violence,” and “intimate partner violence” interchangeably.
33 Burke, supra note 22, at 557; see Charles Patrick Ewing, Psychological
Self-Defense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women Who Kill, 14 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 579, 585–90 (1990).
34 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER
1ST]; LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
WALKER 2ND].
35 See WALKER 1ST, supra note 34, at 55.
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the early research focused on the psychology of the battered
woman.36 Initial advocates made the strategic decision to title
abuse between intimate partners with terms like “domestic
violence” and “battered women” because of a belief that “[s]ociety
would be willing to redress demonstrable physical injury.”37 In
other words, these early advocates realized the difficulty of
capturing the problem’s complexity with a single term. And for
similar reasons, the reformists made the strategic decision to
use existing, singular, transaction-based offenses in the criminal
code, rather than develop a separate offense, one that would
capture the cyclical nature of the abuse.38
The combination of this early research and these strategic
decisions made notable headway in the legal sphere. An
illustrative example of this success is the use and acceptance of
“battered woman’s syndrome” as a valid self-defense in homicide
prosecutions where an abused woman has been charged with
killing her batterer.39 In just twenty or so years, society’s
perspective shifted from one that believed women “‘ask for’ or
provoke the violence”40 to courts blending a subjective and
objective analysis to inquire whether a “reasonable, battered
woman,” not “reasonable person,” would have feared for her life in
the situation. Although this is a necessary shift away from legally
blaming the abused woman for causing her own abuse, the
defense is of limited value as it focuses solely on the woman’s
psychology, which is just one aspect of the abuse. Only recently
has the understanding of “domestic violence” shifted away from
learning about the perspective of the abused woman; today, there
is greater focus on the psychology of why the batterer abuses.

36 See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 32, at 65–67 (explaining the traditional
emphasis on women’s experiences with domestic abuse); WALKER 2ND, supra note 34, at x
(presenting research focused on “the woman’s perceptions in the battering relationship”).
37 See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 32, at 65 (identifying the problems with
defining the “problem”); Burke, supra note 22, at 555.
38 Burke, supra note 22, at 555–56.
39 “Battered woman syndrome” is a type of post-traumatic stress disorder
experienced by victims of domestic violence after years of repetitive abuse; consequently,
women no longer are able to conceptualize a viable escape from the relationship. WALKER
2ND, supra note 34, at 1–11. Much of this research was based on the initial work of Martin
Seligman and the notion of “learned helplessness.” See Martin E.P. Seligman & Steven F.
Maier., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256,
256 (1968).
40 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 32, at 113, 122–23, 138–42; see also State v.
Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (N.J. 1984). Though these defenses are still sometimes viewed
as calling for “special and undeservedly lenient treatment” of women, courts still allow
the syndrome as the basis for self-defense claims, expert testimony admissibility, and
“special cause of action in tort.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 32, at 115.
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The Abuser’s Intent and the Pattern of Abuse: A Growing
Understanding of Domestic Violence

An abuser’s intent is now a crucial and engrained portion
of our modern understanding of intimate partner violence. Unlike
the original four stages model, the majority of social scientists
now view domestic violence more as a pattern of physically and
sexually violent actions stemming from an abuser’s need to assert
“power and control over” his partner.41 A common tool used to
capture this pattern is the Domestic Abuse Intervention
Program’s “Power and Control Wheel.”42 Use of threats,
intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation, economic abuse,
children, male privilege, and minimizing, denying, and blaming
(the Wheel’s spokes) are manifestations of the abuser’s power and
control (the Wheel’s center), and physically and sexually violent
acts (the Wheel’s rim) hold the mechanism all together.43
Current research focuses extensively on what drives a
batterer to act in such a manner.44 Some have examined the
retaliatory nature of an abuser’s actions as stemming from the
abuser’s own insecurities45 or experiences with abuse.46 Others
have focused on comparing the reactions of abusive and
nonabusive men to attempts by their female partners’ own
assertion attempts;47 notably, this study discovered that the
female’s assertion attempt, of any kind, against the male led the
male to respond with aggression, viewing this attempt as “a
41 Burke, supra note 22, at 555; see also EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL:
HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 5 (2007) (arguing a “coercive control”
theory where domestic violence is “a course of calculated, malevolent conduct deployed
almost exclusively by men to dominate individual women by interweaving repeated
physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation, isolation, and control”);
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985–86 (1995). Even the Department of Justice
defines domestic violence “as a pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is
used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate
partner.” Domestic Violence?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ovw/
domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/CR2U-4DZX].
42 For a representation of the Wheel, see Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC
ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAM, http://www.theduluthmodel.org/pdf/PowerandControl.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2E2F-U3UG].
43 Id.
44 See generally LUNDY BANCROFT, WHY DOES HE DO THAT?: INSIDE THE MINDS
OF ANGRY AND CONTROLLING MEN (2002); DONALD G. DUTTON & SUSAN GOLANT, THE
BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 13 (1995) (arguing that repeated abuse stems from
an abuser’s addiction to and dependence on abuse to keep his personality whole); EVE S.
BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE (3d
ed. 2003) (presenting the differences among batterers and the effect those differences make
on the effectiveness of intervention strategies).
45 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 44, at 33.
46 DUTTON & GOLANT, supra note 44, at i–xii.
47 NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 63–67 (1998).
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loss of face, an assault to his sense of honor.”48 This is
particularly important information for advocates of domestic
violence victims to know as it means that “leaving the
relationship is often the most dangerous phase in an abusive
relationship.”49 When advocating for victims of domestic violence,
attorneys, psychologists, legislators, and judges often seek to
enable women to take assertive steps against male abusers. These
steps include obtaining a protection-from-abuse order, seeking
custody of the children, or leaving him altogether. While these
steps may be vital psychological steps for the woman,50 advocates
may actually be encouraging women to act in a way that could
jeopardize their safety. Thus, understanding the psychological
motivations and triggers of abusers can provide critical insight for
those advising clients, drafting legislation, and issuing judicial
decisions for optimal protection of female survivors during this
potentially dangerous time.
In addition to the underlying causes of the abuser’s
desire to assert power and control, research efforts and awareness
campaigns have begun to focus on the pervasive effects of
nonphysical abuse, including threats, intimidation, and emotional
abuse, in intimate partner relationships. These abusive acts may
include: (1) threats to harm the victim, their child(ren), or their
animal(s), (2) threats to take away their child(ren) or animal(s),
(3) repeatedly blaming her for things outside of her control,
criticizing her, degrading her, withholding and conditioning
information or telling her she is crazy and worthless, and (4)
monitoring and stalking her movements, online and in person.51
Just as physical abuse has negative effects on the victim’s
health, nonphysical abuse also leads to serious health
complications, such as depression.52 In fact, psychological abuse
is a greater predictor than physical abuse for Posttraumatic
Id. at 63–64.
Cynthia Fraser et al., The New Age of Stalking: Technological Implications
for Stalking, 61 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 39, 50 (2010).
50 See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for
Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1514–15 (2008) (From the perspective of one victim: “After so
long of just taking it and taking it[,] I needed to be able to show myself as much as
show him that I was tired of being a victim.” (alteration in original)).
51 See BEVERLY ENGEL, THE EMOTIONALLY ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIP: HOW TO
STOP BEING ABUSED AND HOW TO STOP ABUSING 11 (2002); Facts Against Domestic
Violence and Psychological Abuse, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://
ncadv.org/files/Domestic%20Violence%20and%20Psychological%20Abuse%20NCADV.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5M4-U6LW].
52 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: PREVALENCE AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AND NON-PARTNER SEXUAL VIOLENCE 24–25 (2013), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/1
0665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua [https://perma.cc/K2XW-X83W].
48

49
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Stress Disorder in the victim.53 In light of these long-term health
consequences to women, as well as the significant financial costs
to society54 and the devastating impact on the couple’s children,55
domestic violence is a national epidemic that has been further
complicated by the introduction of digital communications.
C.

Domestic Violence and Social Media: The Abuser’s New
Weapon

With the increased prevalence of digital communications
and social media comes a new venue and tool for abusers to
assert power and control over their intimate partners. The “use
of technologies such as texting and social networking to bully,
harass, stalk or intimidate a partner” may take many forms.56
There are programs that, for less than one hundred dollars,
allow abusers to monitor their partner’s every keystroke and
enable him to read her private documents, communications, and
browsing habits.57 There are online services that exist solely to
“get revenge” on exes, which enable abusers to send anonymous
texts, calls, and emails to their victims, send offensive packages,
and create websites to hurt, cause pain to, and humiliate the
victim.58 The use of social media platforms provides an essential
tool to the modern abuser, a free medium with a large audience
for the abuser to further assert his control over his victim. For
instance, an abuser may post disparaging comments, photos,
and videos about his partner online, or use digital means to send
Facts Against Domestic Violence and Psychological Abuse, supra note 51.
See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/pdf/ipvbook-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MW6-QG5W] (finding that, per year,
female victims of intimate partner violence lose almost 8 million days of work, which
equates to approximately 32,000 full-time jobs); Intimate Partner Violence: Consequences,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
intimatepartnerviolence/consequences.html [https://perma.cc/STV3-4D9Z] (estimating
that in 1995 the total cost, including health care and lost productivity, of domestic
violence was $5.8 billion). In 2013, Forbes reported that the annual cost of domestic
violence in the United States had risen to $8.3 billion, a combination of the $5.8 billion in
medical costs and $2.5 billion in lost productivity. Robert Pearl, Domestic Violence: The
Secret Killer that Costs $8.3 Billion Annually, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/robertpearl/2013/12/05/domestic-violence-the-secret-killer-that-costs-8-3-billionannually/#2715e4857a0b76bba7f83c13.
55 See Marielsa Bernard, Domestic Violence’s Impact on Children, MD. B.J.,
May/June 2003, at 10–17.
56 Abuse Defined, THE NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.the
hotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/#tab-id-6 [https://perma.cc/3AEE-64J9].
57 Fraser et al., supra note 49, at 41. For anecdotal stories about how abusers
have used these technologies, see Cynthia Southworth et al., Intimate Partner Violence,
Technology, and Stalking, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 844–50 (2007).
58 See GET REVENGE ON YOUR EX, getrevengeonyourex.com [https://perma.cc/
W2EQ-WY56].
53

54
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negative and threatening communications to his partner.59 He
can use the platforms to spread rumors or share information
about her, or even impersonate her.60 An abuser may also use
social media to “keep constant tabs” on his partner by tracking
where she has been and who she has been with through posted
pictures, status updates, and location “check ins”; he may even
require her to do so.61 He may dictate with whom she can and
cannot be “friends” or expand his social media presence to
include all of her contacts.62 Though women can contact the
website’s host to request removal of the material,63 much of this
behavior “may seem innocuous and random to others” because it
“is very specific and targeted to her” as the abuser “knows what
will terrify the victim and how to increase the victim’s fear.”64
The apparently harmless nature of this behavior can make
seeking and enforcing an order of protection difficult. If a judge
or police officer has not received training on the power dynamics
involved in domestic violence, a Facebook post that does not
“tag” the victim, for example, may not seem like threatening
contact with the victim in violation of a no contact order.
It is as though technological advances have armed abusers
with a “super power,” one that many are using as an evil with real
consequences.65 While the current hard data is minimal, it shows
that abusers’ use of social media to target their partners is now
commonplace.66 Much of the existing data focus on the notion of
“cyberstalking”;67 however use of the term “stalking” is too limited
as these “technologies are also being used to intimidate and
control victims.”68 For instance, Working to Halt Online Abuse
reports that, of the 305 victims of online harassment they helped
in 2011 and agreed to complete a questionnaire, 70 victims had a
Fraser et al., supra note 49, at 47–48.
Id.
61 I observed such behavior as a legal intern with Sanctuary for Families in
the summer of 2015 in New York City.
62 See supra note 61; Fraser et al., supra note 49, at 47–48.
63 Fraser et al., supra note 49, at 48.
64 Id. at 49.
65 Lois D. Fasnacht & Tracy Griffith, Using Technology to Stalk And Harass,
MIDDPENN MATTERS, Sept. 2008, at 6, http://www.midpenn.org/keynotes/Vol18No3
September2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBU9-5FVF].
66 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 3.4 Million People Report Being
Stalked in the United States (Jan. 13, 2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/svu
spr.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCV8-TYWA] (reporting that, of the 3.4 million people who
identified as having been stalked between 2005 and 2006, 1 in 4 had been stalked
through cyberstalking).
67 “The term cyberstalking has been used to describe a variety of behaviors that
involve (a) repeated threats and/or harassment, (b) by the use of electronic mail or other
computer-based communication, (c) that would make a reasonable person afraid or
concerned for his or her safety.” Southworth et al., supra note 57, at 843 (emphasis omitted).
68 Id. at 844.
59
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romantic relationship with their harasser and 41% of all
harassment victims knew their harasser.69 A survey conducted by
the National Network to End Domestic Violence in 2012 revealed
that of the 759 domestic violence agencies surveyed, almost 90%
of agencies had had victims report being threatened through
technology; one third of those threats occurred on social media70
and Facebook.71 And the problem of abusers hacking their partners’
computers is prevalent enough for the organization to have created
an “Internet and Computer Safety” guide.72 When a woman seeks
a protection-from-abuse order—a huge step for her in many
regards—there is an increased likelihood of an abuser taking
further measures to assert power over her as he feels his control
over her is slipping.73 Given how frequently abusers follow through
with their threats, the combination of his internal psychological
mechanisms and the ease with which sites can enable him to
reassert that control can be a deadly combination for victims of
domestic violence, especially those who assert back in any way.
Abusers’ direct threats are “reliable predictors of physical
violence.”74 More than half of those who threaten physical
violence against an intimate partner follow the threat with a

69 WORKING TO HALT ONLINE ABUSE, 2011 CYBERSTALKING STATISTICS 1
(2011), http://www.haltabuse.org/resources/stats/2011Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E
JW2-XUG9]. But see SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMS IN
THE UNITED STATES—REVISED (2012) (finding seven in ten victims of stalking were
acquainted with their stalker in some way).
70 Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. in
Support of Respondent at 14, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983).
71 NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A GLIMPSE FROM THE FIELD:
HOW ABUSERS ARE MISUSING TECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/51dc541ce4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb455a0/1424216502058/NNED
V_Glimpse+From+the+Field+-+2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2P3-KVNJ].
72 Internet and Computer Safety: If You Are in Danger, Please Try to Use a
Safer Computer that Someone Abusive Does Not Have Direct or Remote (Hacking)
Access to, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/internet
safety.html [https://perma.cc/Q4TU-9DXP].
73 See JACOBSON & GOTTMAN, supra note 47, at 62–67 (discussing the stages
of an argument between a batterer and victim and explain that the batterer is unable
to accept any assertion by the woman and the argument does not end until the batterer
feels he has regained a sense of control).
74 Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. in
Support of Respondent, supra note 70, at 9; see JILL M. DAVIES & ELEANOR LYON,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY: COMPLEX LIVES/DIFFICULT CHOICES 118–19 (2d ed.
2014) (describing the research on risk and femicide predictive factors); Mary P.
Brewster, Stalking by Former Intimates: Verbal Threats and Other Predictors of
Physical Violence, 15 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 41 (2000) (conducting a survey of 187 female
stalking victims to determine that an independent and statistically significant
correlation exists between the verbal threats of a former intimate partner and
subsequent acts of violence); Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in
Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1089 (2003) (finding that abusers threats with a weapon and threats to kill
were substantially correlated with acts of femicide).
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significant act of violence.75 One in three women will experience
an assault by an intimate partner, while “[o]ne in twelve women
will be stalked by an intimate partner.”76 And one of the
predictive factors of intimate partner femicide is the male making
prior threats to kill or threats with a weapon.77 Not only are these
threats predictions of a woman’s risk of femicide, but research
shows women can accurately gauge the risk the threats pose to
their own safety.78
The predictive effect of threats combined with women’s
accuracy in perceiving this risk is particularly significant then
for the judicial system to recognize. Take the risk that victims
face after they obtain orders of protection or, as understood
through the abuser’s psychological motivations, make an
attempt to shift the power and control away from the abuser.79
Exertion of technological control becomes critical to an abuser
after a victim has obtained an order of protection that
proscribes physical contact with the victim.80 Social media may
often be his only remaining means of contact and thus control
over the victim if the order does not expressly prohibit such
contact or the judge or police officer enforcing the order does
not consider social media a violation of the order. The legal
system should be taking these electronic threats, and women’s
fear of the risk the threats pose, more seriously.
As mentioned above, there have been significant legal
developments in the last thirty years of domestic violence law
that recognize violent acts between intimate partners as
criminal and not merely an internal family problem.81 However,
considering the more recent data on the role of threats in an
abuser’s need to assert dominance and correlation of threats to
actual injury in intimate partner abuse, it is time for the law to
75 Patricia Tjaden, Prevalence and Characteristics of Stalking, in STALKING:
PSYCHOLOGY, RISK FACTORS, INTERVENTIONS, AND LAW 1-1–1-16 (Mary P. Brewster
ed., 2003).
76 Brief Amici Curiae the Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. in
Support of Respondent, supra note 70, at 9 n.17; Tjaden, supra note 75, at 1–9.
77 Campbell et al., supra note 74, at 1092.
78 See DAVIES & LYON, supra note 74, 118–19 (describing the research on risk
and femicide predictive factors).
79 See Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male
Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING
ORDERS WORK? 199 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (finding that 48.8%
of 668 victims were reabused by their abusers within two years of getting a protectionfrom-abuse order).
80 Laurie L. Baughman, Friend Request or Foe? Confirming the Misuse of
Internet and Social Networking Sites by Domestic Violence Perpetrators, 19 WIDENER
L.J. 933, 941 (2010).
81 See supra Part I; see generally Burke, supra note 22 (explaining how law
enforcement treated domestic violence as a mere nuisance).
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be able to capture the repetitive nature and breadth of conduct
that constitute domestic violence.
D.

The Developments and Remaining Gaps in Domestic
Violence Law: The Inadequacies of Using TransactionBound Statutes

The changing awareness around the prevalence and
pervasiveness of domestic violence has sparked jurisdictions
around the nation to address the problem through a variety of
ways; however, these efforts, and the other available judicial
programs in place, are inadequate. Nationally, in 1994, Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),82 in part to
prosecute perpetrators and protect female victims of domestic
violence. The first federal law of its kind, Congress has
expanded and reauthorized the Act four times.83 Through the
expansions of the Act and other statutes, federal law now
protects victims from many of the interstate actions of their
batterers.84 Such expansions have been made to federal firearm
laws85 to limit abusers’ access to firearms, as well as additional
statutes to deter the commission of and to ensure the safety of
victims of domestic violence, including giving orders of protection
from one state full faith and credit in another state.86
The federal government has also attempted to address
some of the specific harms of cyber communications through the
82 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-332, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701–14040 (2012)); Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong. §§ 40001–703 (1994).
83 Violence Against Women Act, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, http://nnedv.org/policy/issues/vawa.html [https://perma.cc/NEY4-XLRQ].
84 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2012); id. §§ 2261A, 2262. Due to the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, which found certain portions of VAWA
unconstitutionally beyond the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause power, the federal
government may only prohibit domestic violence conduct that is “directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce.” United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–18 (2000) (finding the government’s evidence of the impact
on interstate commerce unconstitutionally “attenuated”).
85 See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012) (possession of firearm while subject to
order of protection); id. § 922(d)(8) (transfer of firearm to person subject to order of
protection); id. § 922(d)(9) (transfer of firearm to person convicted of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence); id. § 922(g)(9) (possession of firearm after conviction of
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence). Just last term, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the prohibition on possessing a firearm after conviction of a
misdemeanor domestic violence crime. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2278–
82 (2016) (finding conviction of a reckless domestic violence assault sufficiently meets
the misdemeanor requirement for prosecution under the statute).
86 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (full faith and credit to orders of protection); see, e.g.,
Amendment of the Brady Statement, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2012); id. § 2263 (detailing
victim’s right to speak at defendant’s bail hearing); 42 U.S.C. § 10607 (services to
victims); 18 U.S.C. § 2264 (restitution to victims); 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012) (self-petitioning
for battered immigrant women and children).
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Interstate Communications Statute and the Interstate Stalking
Statute; these statutes serve as two of the most effective
currently available tools for federally prosecuting perpetrators of
viral intimate partner violence.87 The Interstate Communications
Statute was at issue in Elonis and will be discussed in greater
detail through the course of this analysis. The Interstate Stalking
Statute makes it illegal for someone to cross state lines intending
to “kill, injure, [or] harass” another person, and the person or a
member of the person’s family is placed in fear of serious bodily
injury or death because of or during that travel.88 In 2006,
Congress revised the statute to also proscribe an intent to harass
and conduct that causes substantial emotional stress.89 While
several defendants have challenged the facial constitutionality of
the statute due to overbreadth,90 to date, only one district court
has found the statute unconstitutional as applied.91 Even
assuming the facial validity of this statute, the underlying
problem of these statutes, as well as the similar efforts of states,
is the use of transaction-bound statutes to prosecute perpetrators
of domestic violence.
States have also made similar changes to combat intimate
partner violence, though their attempts are broader given that
the scope of their power is not confined to the regulation of
interstate activity. All fifty states allow warrantless arrests when
officers have probable cause in domestic violence cases and have
antistalking or harassment laws on the books.92 As of 2014,
twenty-one states had mandatory arrest statutes for perpetrators
of domestic violence93 Additionally, some states have gone further
by making changes to their evidence rules to secure more

18 U.S.C. § 875(c); id. § 2261A.
Id. § 2261A.
89 See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
90 United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 434–36 (1st Cir. 2014); United States
v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 943–44 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F.
Supp. 3d 363, 365 (D. Del. 2015).
91 United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 587–88 (D. Md. 2011)
(determining that it did not need to undertake an analysis of facial constitutionality after
finding a statute invalid as applied).
92 Beth Bates Holiday, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Provisions of Federal Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A, 50 A.L.R. Fed.
2d 189 (2010); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1996).
93 Amy M. Zelcer, Note, Battling Domestic Violence: Replacing Mandatory
Arrest Laws with a Trifecta of Preferential Arrest, Officer Education, and Batterer
Treatment Programs, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 546 (2014) (whereas twenty-nine states
mandate arrest when an individual has violated a protection from abuse order); see
also Domestic Violence Arrest Policies By State, ABA COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(Nov. 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Domestic_
Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9623-XVPY].
87

88
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prosecutions of abusers.94 Four states have even gone as far as to
enact separate criminal offenses for domestic violence.95
Unfortunately, “there is little that is truly ‘separate’ about the[ir]
defined offenses.”96 This “separation” entails either (1) grouping
the existing transaction-based statutes that are already used for
intimate partner violence and adding an intimate partner
relationship as an element, or (2) regurgitating the elements of
the existing transaction-bound statutes, such as “assault” or
“harassment,” without using the names of the transaction-bound
statutes, but also without adding any unique elements.97
Another tool states have implemented to combat
domestic violence are holistic court models. One example of such
a model is Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) court, where one
judge hears a family’s criminal and family court matters.98 IDV
courts are economically efficient for all and can be better for the
victim, for example, by sparing the victim further trauma from
needing to repeatedly testify.99 New York has implemented IDV
courts throughout the state.100 New York City’s holistic model,
however, goes beyond typical IDV courts, providing domestic
violence victims a safe place away from their abusers to wait or
meet with their attorneys, or law enforcement, while at any
criminal or family court in all five boroughs.101 Moreover, the
Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence developed Family
94 For instance, some states have removed marital communications and
adverse testimonial privileges, compelling victims of domestic violence to testify
against their abusive spouses against their will. See Malinda L. Seymore, Against the
Peace and Dignity of the State: Spousal Violence and Spousal Privilege, 2 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 239, 240–41 (1995).
95 These states include Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, and Nebraska. See ALA.
CODE § 13 A-6-130-32 (2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-918 (West 2017); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-7(3) (West 1972); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-323(7) (West 2004).
96 Burke, supra note 22, at 561.
97 Id. at 561–63.
98 Integrated Domestic Violence Courts enable one judge to hear the criminal,
family, and matrimonial claims of a family combating domestic violence. Integrated
Domestic Violence Courts, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATIONS, http://www.
courtinnovation.org/project/integrated-domestic-violence-court [https://perma.cc/BF3C6HSF].
99 Streamlining these proceedings, where the judge still applies the
procedural and substantive law that would have applied in a traditional proceeding,
conserves court and litigant resources and improves “information flow” between all
parties, helping to ensure all involved obtain the best outcome. Integrated Domestic
Violence Courts (IDV), N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
family-violence/idv/home.shtml [https://perma.cc/8RNM-754N]; see Integrated Domestic
Violence Courts, supra note 98.
100 Integrated Domestic Violence Courts, supra note 98.
101 Safe Horizon Centers also provide assistance with family and criminal
court proceedings in all five boroughs, including providing a safe place for survivors to
wait and supervision of their children during hearings. Legal & Court Help, SAFE
HORIZON, http://www.safehorizon.org/page/court-programs-73.html [https://perma.cc/X
5UB-3WDN].
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Justice Centers in every borough to “provide criminal justice, civil
legal, and social services all in one location for victims of domestic
violence.”102
Despite of these progressive programs in New York, the
state is still failing to address the breadth of the problems present
in intimate partner violence. While these programs are critical
improvements, the state is still missing the central issue
surrounding domestic violence prosecution: transaction-bound
statutes do not properly codify the offense. Until jurisdictions
cease to use transaction-bound statutes, holistic reform efforts
will continue to have limited redressability value.
Transaction-bound statutes are those that are bound by
a “constricted temporal frame” and center around a singular
incident of harm-producing behavior.103 Statutes like assault,
battery, and sexual assault are transaction-bound statutes in
that they criminalize one violent act that produced one primary
injury. However, even statutes like harassment and stalking—
while no longer temporally constrained as they criminalize more
than one incident—are nevertheless transaction-bound in their
scope, as they focus on only one type of conduct. Use of
transaction-bound offenses is deeply problematic for the
prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence. Transactionbound statutes “isolat[e] and atomiz[e]” the violence in abusive
intimate partner relationships, thus “render[ing] context
meaningless.”104 Without contextual elements in a statute,
evidence of the intimate partner’s abusive relationship beyond the
singular incident is irrelevant to conviction.105 Fundamentally,
these statutes fail to penalize what is illegal about the act of
committing intimate partner violence: the pattern of abuse and
control asserted over another person—that is what we should be
seeking to condemn when, as a society, we choose to prosecute
someone for committing domestic violence.106
The comparison of two factually similar incidents of
cyber communications illustrates the problems of prosecuting
domestic violence with transaction-bound offenses. In New
York, the State can prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence
who make threats on social media using two criminal offenses:
102 Family Justice Centers, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE TO COMBAT DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ocdv/programs/family-justice-centers.page [https://
perma.cc/2U4F-GCQ3].
103 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of
Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959,
972 (2004).
104 Id. at 973.
105 Id. at 974.
106 Burke, supra note 22, at 594–95.
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(1) Harassment in the Second Degree107 and (2) Stalking in the
Fourth Degree.108 Suppose a man repeatedly posted disparaging
and threatening comments on social media about his sister-in-law
sufficient to establish “a course of conduct . . . which alarm[s] or
seriously annoy[s] such other person and which serve[s] no
legitimate purpose.”109 These posts, while repetitive, are but one
type of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys the sister-in-law.
The sister-in-law only needs to present evidence of these posts to
obtain a conviction and she only needs relief from those posts;
similarly, the man only needs to be held responsible for those
posts. In contrast, a battered woman who is experiencing
disparaging and threatening posts on social media by her abusive
partner needs more than just relief from these posts on Facebook.
As a victim of domestic violence, by definition, she is also
experiencing some combination of other threats, intimidation,
and emotional abuse, as well as possible physical, sexual, and
emotional acts on a frequent basis.110 To get sufficient relief and
hold the abuser accountable for all abusive behavior, she may
need to bring in additional contextual factors to explain why the
107 Harassment in the Second Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney
1992). The statute reads in full:

A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person:
1. He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to
physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
2. He or she follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
3. He or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which
alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate
purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
108 Stalking in the Fourth Degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 1999).
The relevant portion of the statute reads:
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally,
and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct:
1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health,
safety or property of such person, a member of such person’s immediate
family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted; or
2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person,
where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating
communication or contact with such person, a member of such person’s
immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and
the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct; or . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
109 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 1992).
110 See Wheel Gallery, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, http://www.
theduluthmodel.org/training/wheels.html [https://perma.cc/A6CQ-E6GU].
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otherwise innocuous posts are actually disparaging and
threatening given her relationship with her partner. Transactionbound statutes however, fail to criminalize the repetitive pattern
of abuse and assertion of power and control over another that
makes domestic violence criminal behavior; current domestic
violence statutes are thus failing at two of the primary purposes
of criminalizing behavior: deterrence and retribution.111
If statutes are ineffective at prosecuting criminal
behavior, then abusers are not deterred from continuing the
abuse and abused women do not receive the vindication they
deserve from the criminal justice system. As the next section will
demonstrate, however, there is a fine line between balancing
protecting victims from these threats and the abuser’s First
Amendment rights. With a greater understanding of an abuser’s
intent, the increasing prevalence of social media, and the
inadequacies of existing domestic violence law, the legal
landscape desperately needs and is ready for a national domestic
violence law.
II.

TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE: DEFINITION, CASE LAW, AND
AN UNRESOLVED STANDARD
“Art is about pushing limits. I’m willing to go to jail for my
Constitutional rights. Are you?”112

The First Amendment guarantees that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”; however,
“true threats” are one of the limited categories of speech that
the guarantee does not include.113 The other categories of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment are: speech essential to
criminal conduct,114 defamation,115 incitement of violence
(“‘fighting’ words”116 or panic),117 fraud,118 and obscenities.119 As
Burke, supra note 22, at 588, 595.
Posted by Anthony Douglas Elonis on Facebook. Brief for the United
States, supra note 5, at 7.
113 U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)
(per curiam); see also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are
outside the First Amendment.”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
774 (1994); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 373–74 (1997)
(applying Madsen holding).
114 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
115 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1952) (“There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, [and] the libelous . . . .”).
116 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (stating
that a state may ban speech “which by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to
incite an immediate breach of the peace”).
111

112
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the Supreme Court explained, “[i]f there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”120 Thus, what makes
these categories of speech fall outside of First Amendment
protection is that they create some sort of harm to society, one
from which the Government has an interest in protecting its
citizens.121 The Court has also made it clear that the unique
qualities of the internet122 do not “qualify” speech made on the
medium; internet speech is subject to the same protection “of
First Amendment scrutiny” that all other types of speech
receive.123 Thus, if the government cannot establish that a
speaker’s internet speech is a true threat, that speech is afforded
full First Amendment protection and he cannot be prosecuted for
those words. However, when the Court defined “true threats”
as “statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual,”124 it did not clarify what
standard of intent the government must prove to qualify that
speech as a true threat.
This lack of clarity regarding the requisite mens rea is
significant in any criminal prosecution because of the crucial
role intent plays in establishing guilt of a crime. A “general
rule” of criminal law “is that a guilty mind is ‘a necessary element

117 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic.”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
118 See Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976) (opining that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never
been protected for its own sake”).
119 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding “that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”); Aily
Shimizu, Recent Development, Domestic Violence in the Digital Age: Towards the
Creation of a Comprehensive Cyberstalking Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
116, 132 (2013).
120 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
121 See infra Section II.A.
122 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 n.30 (1997) (“First, the Internet presents
very low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers
and listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is
available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who wish
to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers.”).
123 Id. at 870; Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (opining
that “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology,
‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s
command, do not vary’ when a new and different medium for communication appears.”)
(quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)); see also Shimizu,
supra note 119, at 131–32.
124 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
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in the indictment and proof of every crime.’”125 The government
cannot prosecute someone by merely establishing actus reus,126
rather, a “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”127 But
that level of “consciousness” varies. Criminal statutes can require
either two types of mens rea:128 general or specific intent. An
individual had “general intent” to commit a crime if she intended
to commit the act itself.129 Mr. Elonis had the general intent to
post comments on Facebook, he did not do so by accident, or
unknowingly. In contrast, a person has “specific intent” when she
not only intended to commit the act, but intended to commit the
act with which she was later charged.130 Importantly, to have
specific intent, the defendant “need not know that those facts
make his conduct illegal.”131 For Mr. Elonis to have had specific
intent, he must not just have intended to post a comment to
Facebook, but to have intended to communicate a threatening
message—he did not have to know that communicating the
message was illegal.
At issue in Elonis—and the still-unresolved question in
true threat cases—is how much does someone have to intend for
speech to be a threat for it to constitute a “true threat.” There
are varying levels of intent that one may have to be culpable:
purposeful,132 knowing,133 reckless,134 and negligent.135 Many
125 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (quoting United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)).
126 Defined as “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of
a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal
liability.” Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
127 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
128 Defined as “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction,
must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” Mens Rea, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
129 General Intent, in Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
130 Specific Intent, in Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
131 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2019 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
132 With respect to one of the material elements of an offense, a defendant acts
purposely:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result;
and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (2015).
133 With respect to one of the material elements of an offense, a defendant acts
knowingly
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
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statutes are clear as to the level of specific intent needed to be
guilty of the crime; for instance, one of the statutes frequently
used to prosecute true threat cases makes it a crime to
“knowingly and willfully” make a threat to injure or take the life
of the President of the United States by mail;136 the Interstate
Communications Act is not such a statute. All agree that even
though the statute lacks an express intent level, a purposeful or
knowing issuance of a threat constitutes an unprotected “true
threat.”137 Thus, the issue before the Court in Elonis was when a
statute is silent as to intent, what level of intent, if any, must
the government establish to convict someone of a true threat.
A.

True Threats: Why They Are Not Protected First
Amendment Speech

True threats fall outside of First Amendment protection
because they create a harm to society from which the government
has an interest in protecting its citizens. One type of harm true
threats produce is a fear of violence.138 The government has an
interest in protecting people from that fear, from the disruption to
their lives that fear fosters, and from the societal costs it
creates.139 As described in the previous section, victims of
domestic violence can experience significant disruption to their
lives as a result of these threats.140 Emotionally, they may end
134

recklessly

With respect to one of the material elements of an offense, a defendant acts

when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
135 With respect to one of the material elements of an offense, a defendant acts
negligently
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
136 18 U.S.C. § 871 (2012).
137 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012, 2019 (2015).
138 Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 290 (2002).
139 Id. at 290–91.
140 See supra Section I.B.
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up staying with their abuser or not seeking protection from the
state out of fear of what the consequence for doing so may be to
her, or her child(ren); these are coerced actions that have
significant short- and long-term psychological consequences.141
Financially, the threats may cause her to take time off of work to
seek a protection-from-abuse order, pay for additional childcare
while she works with the judicial system, hire legal counsel, or
in some cases, relocate her family for safety.142 These threats
also cost taxpayers money. Think of the Pennsylvania state
resources spent for Tara to obtain her initial protection-fromabuse order, for police officers and the FBI to investigate Mr.
Elonis’s posts, and the aggregate legal costs to taxpayers in
prosecuting and appointing an attorney from the federal public
defender’s office to represent Mr. Elonis.143
Further, the government has two additional interests
that make true threats fall outside of protected First Amendment
speech. First, the government has a legitimate interest in
ensuring people are not being coerced to act in a manner against
their will.144 There is a very real, coercive effect of threats; they
can be “situation-altering,” meaning that the threatened person
abstains from acting or partakes in a course of behavior he or she
would not have undertaken were it not for the threat.145 For
example, a woman should not be forced to stay with an abusive
partner, prevented from seeking employment or from seeing her
family out of fear for her life or that of her children; speech that
burdens women this way should not be afforded First
Amendment protection.146 And second, the government has an
interest in “incarcerat[ing] people who have identified
themselves as likely to carry out a threatened crime before they
have the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.”147 Given the
research regarding how predictive abusers’ threats are to violent
episodes,148 the state has a legitimate interest in creating “a
mechanism for protecting them prior to the commission or
attempt of a violent act.”149 With all of this said, courts must
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 52, at 2, 5, 7–8 fig.1.
According to Forbes, the annual cost of domestic violence in the United
States had risen to $8.3 by 2013, a combination of the $5.8 billion in medical costs and
$2.5 billion in lost productivity. Pearl, supra note 54.
143 Docket at 3, United States v. Elonis, No. 5:11-cr-00013-LS (E.D. Pa. 2011).
144 Rothman, supra note 138, at 290–91.
145 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 67 (1989).
146 See the examples of such situations provided in Brief of Amici Curiae the
Nat’l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. in Support of Respondent, supra note
70, at 4–7; see also Rothman, supra note 138, at 292–93.
147 Rothman, supra note 138, at 290.
148 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
149 Rothman, supra note 138, at 292.
141

142
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straddle the fine line between when a threatening statement is
protected First Amendment “pure” speech or a prosecutable
“true threat.”
B.

True Threats: The Case Law—When Striking a
Constitutional Balance, Intent, Context, and Societal
Value of the Speech Matter

Examination of true threat case law reveals how the
judiciary has been striking the balance between citizens’ First
Amendment rights and the government’s protection interests
when it comes to threatening speech. This balance occurs by
analyzing the objective and subjective intent of the speaker, the
speech’s context, and the societal value of the speech. In
attempting to strike a balance, however, the Court has made the
analysis murky.
1. The Early True Threat Doctrine
In the first true threat case before the Supreme Court,
the Court used an objective, reasonable person standard for
prosecution of a true threat without express mention of a specificintent requirement. During the Vietnam War, while participating
in a small discussion group at a political rally, a man was
convicted for violating a federal law proscribing “knowingly and
willfully” making threats against the president.150 The man said
“[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J.”151 In Watts v. United States, the Supreme
Court was confronted for the first time with the issue of “whether
or not [a] ‘willfullness’ requirement of [a] statute implie[s] that a
defendant must have intended to carry out his ‘threat.’”152 In
holding, per curiam, that the man’s statement was “political
hyperbole,” not a “true threat,” and thus protected First
Amendment speech, the Court stated the government must
prove the threat is “true,” without much further elaboration.153
However, the Court did not avoid the intent issue entirely, as it
did list the “reaction of the listeners” as one of the factors it
used to determine whether the speech constituted a true
threat.154 In addition to the “reaction of the listeners” and the
150 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705–06 (1969) (per curiam) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 871(a) (1962)).
151 Id. at 706.
152 Id. at 707.
153 Id. at 708.
154 Id.
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speech being “hyperbole,” the Court provided some guidance as
to characteristics that could help with the determination,
specifically the “context” of the speech and the “expressly
conditional nature of the statement.”155 For the Watts Court, the
context of the “political arena,” where speech is “often
vituperative, abusive, and inexact,” was of particular importance
to finding the speech to be protected by the First Amendment.156
Political speech is one of the purest and most protected forms of
speech, not just because it was initially the abstract principle
behind the First Amendment right, but because of the great
societal value it brings with it.157 Further examination of the
case law reveals that when speech has such value, the Court
tends toward concluding the speech is protected.
The Court’s determination that speeches made by
prominent activist Charles Evers during the Civil Rights
Movement did not constitute true threats further illustrates the
importance of a speech’s societal value in true threat analysis.158
During his “lengthy [public] addresses,” Mr. Evers, the NAACP
field secretary in Mississippi, used “strong language” with the
specific intention of inciting the approximately 8000 African
American residents of Claiborne County into boycotting white
businesses.159 In one such speech, Mr. Evers stated that all
“‘[U]ncle [T]oms’ who broke the boycott would ‘have their necks
broken’ by their own people.”160 Mr. Evers made this speech with
a specific intent-to-threaten, to do harm to particular people and
their businesses, and to coerce specific individuals to relinquish
their rights to visit an establishment of their choosing or die.161
Yet the Court found Mr. Evers’s speech to be protected.162
Rather than address whether Mr. Evers’s speech was a true
threat, the Court sidestepped the issue, referenced its Watts
decision with a mere footnote, and then concluded that to rule
any other way would be to ignore the “‘profound national
commitment’ that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited,

Id.
Id.
157 The abstract principle underlying the First Amendment was the framers’
and ratifiers’ fear of the Federal Government stifling and punishing speech regarding
dissatisfaction with the Federal Government. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)
(As Justice Black said, “[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations of the
First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”).
158 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982).
159 Id. at 890, 900 n.28, 928.
160 Id. at 900 n.28.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 907–15.
155
156
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robust, and wide-open.’”163 Thus, when the Court deems speech
“valuable” to society, it appears that certain forms of coercion
such as strikes, threatening to file lawsuits, and boycotting even
when enforced through intimidation—are protected speech.164 It
was not until 2003 that the Supreme Court took advantage of an
opportunity to decide the requisite intent of a prosecutable true
threat.
2. True Threat Doctrine and Requisite Intent
In Virginia v. Black, the Court addressed whether, under
the First Amendment, statutes that criminalize true threats
require a subjective intent standard.165 A majority of the Court
held that, in accordance with the First Amendment, a state could
“ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate”;
however, the Virginia statute, as-written, made cross-burning
prima facie evidence of intent-to-threaten, thereby violating the
First Amendment.166 In doing so, the Court provided an example
of how to strike the constitutionally necessary balance of a state
protecting its citizens from intimidation and a citizen’s First
Amendment right to express an ideological message.
As Justice O’Connor opined, a state “may choose to
regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross
burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
violence” but only when the state can show that it was done with
an intent-to-threaten.167 Of particular significance to a potential
domestic violence statute, however, is the differentiation the
Black Court made between this statute and the one it found
unconstitutional in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.168 At issue in R.A.V.
was a St. Paul statute that banned any “bias-motivated” display.
The Court held that the statute was facial, content-based
discrimination by targeting those who “provoke violence ‘on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”169 Read together
then, there are some types of content-based banning—like

163 Id. at 928–29 & n.71 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)).
164 For examples, see Rothman, supra note 138, at 293.
165 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 363.
168 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
169 Id. at 381, 387, 391. The St. Paul’s Statute banned a “bias-motivated” display
that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.” Id. at 380–81 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St.
Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
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burning a cross to intimidate another—that do not have a
“significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination.”170
The most significant contribution of the opinion,
however, came in its definition of a “true threat.” Going farther
than the Watts Court, the plurality defined “true threats” as
“statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence.”171 While this definition by the Court would seem to
signal a subjective intent-to-threaten standard for the
government in a true threat statute, based on the Court’s true
threat case law and conceptualization of mens rea172 in criminal
law, only the Ninth Circuit has consistently interpreted the
definition in this capacity; the remaining circuits split as to
how to interpret this new language.
C.

True Threats: Black’s “Additional” Subjective-Intent
Standard or Merely Guidance on the Type of Objective
Standard to Use?

Prior to Elonis, the Ninth (and Tenth)173 Circuits were
the only circuits to have read an additional subjective intentto-threaten standard into true threat cases.174 That is, the
circuits interpreted the Supreme Court’s “true threat” definition
in Black to require that the prosecution prove the subjective
intent of a declarant to threaten for any declarant prosecuted
under any threat statutes “that criminalize pure speech.”175 In
effect then, even if a statute textually calls for an objective
determination, a court must also conduct a subjective analysis.176
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Bagdasarian
illustrates this interpretation as the circuit wrote it specifically
to “clear[ ] up” any confusion of the elements necessary for the
government to establish a true threat.177
In United States v. Bagdasarian, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the conviction of a man who threatened to kill thenBlack, 538 U.S. at 361–62 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).
Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
172 See supra Section II.A.
173 Mere months before the Supreme Court decided Elonis, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the First Amendment requires that the government establish a speaker’s
intent-to-threaten for the speech to be a true threat. United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d
970, 976, 982 (10th Cir. 2014). However, this is the circuit’s only use of a subjective
standard; the circuit’s true threats case law features disjointed and inconsistent
standards. Fuller, supra note 14, at 59–61.
174 See Fuller, supra note 14, at 38–39 & n.9, 69–70.
175 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
176 Fuller, supra note 14, at 70.
177 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1116–17.
170

171
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presidential candidate Barack Obama by posting anonymously
to a Yahoo Finance message board, because the message lacked
the subjective requisite intent-to-threaten, in addition to not
meeting the requisite objective, reasonable person standard.178
The circuit court relied in particular on context factors to
establish that no reasonable person would hear Bagdasarian’s
expression and consider it a serious threat to kill or injure the
presidential candidate.179 These factors included: the financial
character of the message board, that only one user reported the
message, and that the post was anonymous.180 The circuit court
then held that the defendant did not intend “that the
statement be understood as a threat.”181 It was critical for the
circuit court that the defendant did not have anything in his
possession to indicate he had a means to carry out the threat,
and that the defendant had no pattern of harm following the
Internet communications.182
This blended approach, in light of the Elonis Court’s
negligence holding and absent a domestic violence statute, can
help advocates of victims of domestic violence better advocate for
their clients, knowing that, “absent directly threating language or
factual context indicating that the defendant controls and
plans to use certain means to carry out a threat,” cases will
likely be unsuccessful.183 Thus, advocates must inquire about
both the subjective and objective factors prior to prosecution.
Examination of the other circuits’ Black interpretations provides
further insight for a domestic violence statute.
Unlike the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the rest of the
circuits read the definition of a “true threat” provided in Black
as still merely requiring an objective standard to true threat
analyses; however, the circuits differ as to whether the standard
is that of a reasonable listener or speaker. The Second, Fourth,
Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply a “reasonable listener” standard,
like that of the Ninth Circuit, where no reasonable person would
hear the expression and consider it a serious threat to kill or
injure the presidential candidate.184 Other circuits, like the
178 Id. at 1115, 1123–24. The first message read “Re: Obama fk the niggar, he
will have a 50 cal in the head soon” and the second “shoot the nig.” Id. at 1115.
179 Id. at 1118.
180 Id. at 1120.
181 Id. at 1118.
182 Id. at 1119–20 n.19. But see Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154 (D. Or. 1999), aff’d in part and remanded, 290 F.3d
1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002).
183 See Fuller, supra note 14, at 71.
184 For instance, the Sixth Circuit, has held that a speaker’s subjective intent
“had nothing to do with” the true threat analysis. United States v. Jefferies, 692 F.3d 473,
479 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 59 (2013). Rather, the circuit stated Black was
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Third, Tenth, and Eleventh, interpret Black as saying the First
Amendment requires a “reasonable speaker” standard instead.185
Under the “reasonable speaker” standard, a true threat exists
“when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would
be interpreted as a threat.”186 Elonis did not clarify whether
circuits should use a reasonable listener or speaker standard.
Thus, in addition to leaving an unanswered question as to the
level of “additional” intent-to-threaten an abuser must have,
Elonis also left lower courts without guidance as to the objective
standard it should use.
This lack of clarity is of particular importance to domestic
violence law. To be better equipped to prosecute abusers, both
standards would need to be able to include contextual factors that
transform the inquiry from being a “reasonable speaker” to a
“typical abuser” and from a “reasonable listener” to “a reasonable
domestic violence victim.” Having to prove what a “typical abuser”
foresees as threatening requires the state to put on a very
different case than needing to establish how the speech
constitutes a threat to a reasonable domestic violence victim.
Thus, having never heard a case about true threats in the context
of social media or between intimate partners, the Supreme Court
was presented with a massive, and critical, opportunity to clarify
the federal standard in Elonis.
D.

The Missed Opportunity of Elonis v. United States: Still
Not the Whole Solution for Domestic Violence Law

Rather than provide the circuits guidance as to the
applicable standards when determining what constitutes a
“true threat,” the Supreme Court in Elonis v. United States
merely announced that negligence is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction for transmitting threats through interstate commerce.187
Though this indicates that some specific intent is necessary, the
Court declined to rule that establishing a defendant’s
recklessness would be sufficient for a true threat conviction
because the parties did not brief the issue.188 Instead, the
simply decided on the “overbreadth” of the Virginia statute, and not what the First
Amendment requires the government establish in all threat statutes. Id. at 480. See also
Fuller, supra note 14, at 63–69 for a thorough presentation of each circuit’s reasonable
listener case law.
185 See Fuller, supra note 14, at 55–63 for a thorough presentation of each
circuit’s reasonable speaker case law.
186 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct.
2001 (2015).
187 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011–13 (2015).
188 Id. at 2012–13. The Court explained that it is “wrong” to state that the
decision does not clarify “confusion in the lower courts” because no court of appeals has
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majority limited its guidance for lower courts to the following:
use “only that mens rea which is necessary to separate
wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”189
Since his initial motion to dismiss, Mr. Elonis had
argued the First Amendment mandates the government prove he
“subjectively intended to convey a threat to injure” others when
making these posts to convict him of interstate communication of
threats; his posts were protected “pure speech” and did not
constitute “true threats.”190 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
however, convicted Mr. Elonis of interstate communication of a
threat,191 reasoning that “true threats” require an objective,
reasonable person standard—that is, whether a reasonable
person would regard the communication as a threat.192 The
Supreme Court disagreed.
To separate innocent from criminal conduct, under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c), the government argued it needed to prove
whether Elonis “himself knew the contents and context of his
posts, and a reasonable person would have recognized that the
posts would be read as genuine threats.”193 However, the
majority clarified that the inquiry is “whether a defendant
knew the character of what was sent, not simply its contents
and context.”194 Thus, to be guilty of transmitting an interstate
communication of a threat, Mr. Elonis must have “know[n] the
threatening nature” of his Facebook posts; that a reasonable
person would view the speech as threatening cannot itself
support a conviction for the transmission of a threat through
interstate commerce.195 Consequently, even though Mr. Elonis
repeatedly posted comments that a reasonable person would
find threatening, the Court found the government had not
established that he possessed the requisite intent for his
speech to be prosecutable.196

yet examined the question of whether recklessness suffices; consequently, the majority
“decline[d] to be the first appellate tribunal to do so.” Id. at 2013.
189 Id. at 2010 (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
190 Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 2–3, United States v. Elonis, No. 5:11-cr00013-LS (E.D. Pa. 2011); see supra Part II.
191 The jury convicted Mr. Elonis of four of the five charged counts. Brief for
the United States, supra note 5, at 12. The jury acquitted on the charge for the posts
regarding the employees and patrons of his former employer. Id. The court then
sentenced Mr. Elonis to forty-four months in jail, of which he served three years.
Barnes, supra note 14.
192 See supra Section II.B.
193 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
194 Id. at 2012.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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Since the decision, lower courts have interpreted this
requisite “knowledge” to mean a variety of things. Some courts
read the Elonis holding as limited to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)197 and
have yet to really expand it beyond true threat analysis under
the statute.198 A district court in Virginia, however, concluded
that “the Fourth Circuit’s objective approach [to intent-tothreaten] remains undisturbed” because the Supreme Court
decided Elonis on narrow “statutory interpretation grounds.”199
But the choice between a subjective or an object intent-tothreaten standard “reflects a false dichotomy” as the Constitution
requires both analyses.200 That a district court still views the
standard as an either-or option illustrates how critical of a
misstep the Supreme Court took when it failed to make these
true threat standards clear in its Elonis holding. With that said,
such a clarification still would not have resolved the fundamental
problems with domestic violence prosecutions.
The root of the difficulty in prosecuting abusers does not
stem from the lack of clarity in the true threat doctrine, no
matter how much domestic violence advocates may want it to.
The problem underlying prosecuting perpetrators of domestic
violence online is not with the doctrine of true threats; “[i]t is
settled that the Constitution does not protect true threats.”201
The issue is also not with the government’s need to establish a
specific intent-to-threaten requirement. While the Court would
not go as far as to declare this level of intent a requirement of
the First Amendment,202 a foundational goal of freedom of
speech is to have a “free trade in ideas.”203 To achieve that, the
First Amendment must protect speech and ideas that add value
to society, even when “the overwhelming majority of people
might find [the speech] distasteful or discomforting.”204 This
197 United States v. Fitzgerald, No. 5:15-cr-55-01, 2015 WL 9582144, at *1 (D.
Vt. Dec. 30, 2015) (examining the crime of threatening a public official in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (2012)); United States v. Wright-Darrisaw, 617 F. App’x 107, 108
(2d Cir. 2015) (analyzing threatening to kill the President of the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2012)).
198 United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220–21 (2016) (finding that, given
Elonis, an instruction to the jury on the intent level necessary to convict a husband of
sending threatening communications to his wife via email under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) was
error, but harmless); United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 669–70 (6th Cir. 2015)
(reversing defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)).
199 Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712, 729
n.22 (E.D. Va. 2015).
200 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2011).
201 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015).
202 Id. at 2012 (stating it is “not necessary to consider any First Amendment
issues” given the Court’s “disposition”).
203 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
204 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).
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means the First Amendment must afford offensive or disagreeable
speech that adds value to society the fullest protection of law.205
Because the First Amendment affords stringent protection
to pure political speech, many of the statements Mr. Elonis made,
such as those he made about law enforcement and the
government, must be protected speech.206 The objective and
subjective intent of Mr. Elonis, the “rap lyrics” context, and the
societal value of portions of his posts render them protected
speech under First Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, after
a female FBI agent visited his home to investigate his Facebook
posts, Mr. Elonis posted:
You know your s***’s ridiculous when you have the FBI knockin’ at
yo’ door . . .
....
So the next time you knock, you best be serving a warrant . . .
....
Are all the pieces comin’ together? S***, I’m just a crazy sociopath
that gets off playin’ you stupid f***s like a fiddle . . .
....
Cause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes attention who happens
to be under investigation for terrorism cause y’all think I’m ready to
turn the Valley into Fallujah . . .
....
And if you really believe this s*** I’ll have some bridge rubble to sell
you tomorrow
[BOOM!] [BOOM!] [BOOM!]207

Here, Mr. Elonis’s speech is comparable to the “political
hyperbole” of the Watts Vietnam protester.208 Although not
phrased conditionally like the Watts speech, as discussed
above, disclaimers run throughout the post, such as “if you
really believe this” and reference to his rapping aspirations.209
205 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (supporting the Court’s
extensive modern First Amendment case law).
206 See Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 5–6. See supra Section
II.B.1 for a discussion of the expansive First Amendment protection of political speech
in opposition to the government and its officials.
207 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007 (quoting United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321,
336 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)).
208 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
209 Compare Watts’s speech, id., with that of Elonis, see Elonis v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015) (e.g., “Cause I’m just an aspiring rapper who likes
the attention.”).
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Facebook can be used as a modern “political arena,” where
speech is “often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”210 And, like
the defendant in Bagdasarian, Mr. Elonis did not have
anything in his possession, such as a bomb, that would enable
him to carry out the “threat.”211 Similarly, he had no history of
following up his social media posts about government officials
with acts of violence.212 Additionally, Mr. Elonis posted about
warrant requirements, terrorism, and police interrogation;
these are all issues surrounding the relationship between the
government and its citizens, discussion of which adds value to
society. But while discussion of “public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”213 the same cannot be said
regarding the speech Mr. Elonis made about his ex-wife.
Because the Supreme Court in Elonis held that some
level of intent, not negligence, is required in proving a
communication violation, the issue domestic violence victim
advocates need to address is how to establish that Mr. Elonis
knew the threatening nature of his posts about Tara. That
solution will not come from the Court, or from clarification to true
threat intent requirements, but from having a statute that will
enable the government to prosecute true threats separately from
protected First Amendment speech. The solution is a statute that
is able to criminalize the harm of domestic violence, one that
balances the First Amendment rights of the abuser with the
government’s interest in protecting victims of domestic violence.
III.

A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATUTE: WHY WE CAN AND
SHOULD MOVE FROM USING EXISTING TRANSACTIONBOUND OFFENSES TO A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SPECIFIC
OFFENSE
Fold up your PFA [protection-from-abuse order] and put it in your
pocket
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?
Try to enforce an Order that was improperly granted in the first
place

See generally Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1119–20 nn.19–20 (9th Cir.
2011). But see Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette v. Am. Coal. of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1155 n.1 (D. Or. 1999), aff’d in part and remanded, 290
F. 3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the speaker’s actual intention to carry out
the threat is immaterial to the subjective intent-to-threaten determination).
212 Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1123.
213 Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S.
254, 270 (1964)).
210

211
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threat

And prison time’ll add zeros to my settlement
Which you won’t see a lick cause you suck dog dick in front of
children
And if worse comes to worse
I’ve got enough explosives to take care of the State Police and the
Sheriff ’ s Department
[link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org]214

There is a significant difference between what domestic
violence is and what the government currently prosecutes as
domestic violence. The enacted changes to domestic violence
law in most jurisdictions are procedural and not substantive;
they are a “symbolic” acknowledgment of the problem “[t]o serve
the expressive function of punishment.”215 The existing criminal
statutes penalize “transaction-based physical violence” and do
not recognize the context, frequency, or motivation behind the
incidents.216 In avoiding the “politically [more] difficult—and
arguably less pragmatic” task of getting laws on the books that
prosecute the true crime of repeatedly asserting power and
control over another, prosecutors have been stuck with laws that
do not capture that which is criminal about domestic violence.217
This is so because reformists and activists decided that, for the
sake of getting much needed reform passed quickly for victims
in desperate need of legal protection, using existing statutes
would be the easiest way to make such protection happen.218
Transaction-bound offenses like “assault” and “harassment” are
no longer—and arguably never were—sufficient to prosecute
domestic violence offenders as they only recognize some aspects
of the criminal actions of an abuser.
A.

The Fatal Limitations of Current Federal Statutes for
the Prosecution of Perpetrators of Domestic Violence

The federal statutes presently available to prosecute
batterers force the government to rely on general, transactionbound statutes. Not only are these statutes particularly ill214 Mr. Elonis posted this on Facebook in response to his wife obtaining a
protection-from-abuse order. Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 7–8.
215 Burke, supra note 22, at 562–63.
216 Tuerkheimer, supra note 103, at 962.
217 Burke, supra note 22, at 565.
218 Id. at 559, 565.
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suited for the confounding novel issues presented by social
media and the internet, but they fail to adequately address the
context factors that make threats by abusers unique.
Consequently, the absence of a “domestic violence statute” forces
the government to use the Federal Telephone Harassment
Statute,219 the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and
Prevention Act,220 or the Interstate Communications Act—as
seen in Elonis—to prosecute perpetrators of intimate partner
violence. The Interstate Communications Act provides that
transmitting “any communication containing any threat . . . to
injure the person of another” in interstate or foreign commerce is
a federal crime.221 This means that to prosecute a batterer under
the Act, the government must establish (1) a transmission in
interstate commerce or foreign commerce, (2) a threatening
communication, and (3) a threat to injure or kidnap. Though the
text of the statute would not seem to present a significant bar to
prosecuting domestic violence perpetrators, the statute is
problematic in two ways. First, it runs into the true threat
doctrine, as discussed in detail above, often transforming the
abusive, prosecutable speech of a perpetrator into protected
speech. Second, the limited language of the statute narrows its
practical application.
By limiting prosecutable speech to only threats to injure
or kidnap, the statute precludes all other forms of threats,
threats that have real consequences for a victim of gender-based
violence. For instance, speech like “if you do this, I will make
sure you are deported,” may not be interpreted as an explicit
threat to “injure” or to “kidnap.” Yet, if the woman is a U.S.
citizen through marriage, does not understand the complexities of
immigration law, and has children with the abuser, then the
threat of deportation is just as serious as a threat to injure or
kidnap. Further, it is likely the abuser is consciously choosing to
use this particular threat because he knows the effect it will
have on his victim. Thus, under transaction-bound statutes,
speech that appears as if the abuser only meant to annoy or
harass a victim will be protected First Amendment speech
because of the statute’s narrow language that precludes
inclusion of the speech’s relevant context.222
Rather than continuing to rely on these ineffective
transaction-bound statutes, Congress needs to enact a statute,
219
220
221
222

47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).
Id. § 875(c).
See Shimizu, supra note 119, at 133.
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like Professor Burke’s “Coercive Domestic Violence” statute, that
captures the true harm of domestic violence. Victims of domestic
violence especially need such a statute today because of the
increasing use of social media as a weapon-of-choice for batterers.
B.

The Coercive Domestic Violence Statute: The Answer to
the Problem of Prosecuting Perpetrators of Domestic
Violence While Protecting Abusers’ First Amendment
Rights in a Digital Age

There is a fine line between honoring the constitutionally
guaranteed First Amendment rights of abusers and protecting
those experiencing intimate partner harm from threats made on
social media. However, Professor Burke’s Coercive Domestic
Violence statute achieves that balance by requiring the
government prove an abuser’s intent to coerce. With the
increased awareness of domestic violence and abusers’
intentions,223 the growing threat of social media to victims of
domestic violence,224 and the publicity around and the shortcomings of the Elonis decision,225 advocates of victims of
domestic violence can capitalize on these factors to finally enact
this much needed legislation.
1. Professor Burke’s Proposed Coercive Domestic
Violence Statute: A Viable Model
To be successful, a new intimate partner violence statute
must address the recurrent nature of abuse, its coercive dynamic,
and allow consideration of the abuser’s intent.226 Further, it must
not be redundant but rather “seek to identify, define, and punish
a unique wrong: the attempt to limit the autonomy of another
person through specified means.”227 Such a law must also
recognize both the particular “quantitative and qualitative”
features of domestic violence that existing statutes do not
embody,228 while still conforming to “established tenets of
criminal law.”229
Professor Alafair Burke’s Coercive Domestic Violence
statute is such a statute.230 It addresses the insufficiencies of
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230

See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section II.D.
Burke, supra note 22, at 595–96.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 598.
See id. at 601–02.
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the existing criminal statutes used to prosecute domestic
violence while affording protection to abuser’s First Amendment
rights. The proposed statute states that “[a] person commits the
crime of Coercive Domestic Violence if the person attempts to
gain power or control over an intimate partner through a
pattern of domestic violence.”231 The statute goes on to define
“intimate partner,”232 “gain power or control,”233 and “pattern of
domestic violence.”234
The Coercive Domestic Violence statute expands upon one
presented by Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer.235 As Professor
Burke points out, however, Professor Tuerkheimer’s proposal has
a fatal flaw that Professor Burke’s Coercive Domestic Violence
statute remedies. Professor Tuerkheimer’s “battering” statute
fails when it combines language evoking the negligence mens
rea—“reasonably should know”—with attempt language—“likely
to result,”—since “[o]ne cannot attempt what he does not
intend.”236 The effect of this combination would be the possibility
for the conviction of someone who only negligently caused a likely
coercive act.237 Thus, while Professor Tuerkheimer attempts to
align the law with the social science behind the dynamic of power
and control in domestic violence, she “depart[s] from established
tenets of criminal law.”238 Constitutionally, a speaker cannot
“bear[ ] the responsibility for all reasonable interpretations of
their incendiary posts, regardless of whether the speaker actually
intended to threaten.”239
The Coercive Domestic Violence statute’s narrow
language and explicit mens rea requirement protect it from
being too overinclusive and unconstitutional.240 This narrowness
Id. at 601.
Defined as “a spouse; a former spouse; persons who have a child in common,
whether or not they have been married or lived together at any time; and persons who
are or were involved in a dating relationship.” Id. at 601–02 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-323(8) (West 2005)).
233 Defined as “to restrict another’s freedom of action.” Id. at 602.
234 Defined as “the commission of two or more incidents of assault, harassment,
menacing, kidnapping, or any sexual offense, or any attempts to commit such offenses,
committed against the same intimate partner.” Id. (footnote omitted).
235 Under Professor Tuerkheimer’s proposed “battering” statute, one would be
guilty of the crime of “battering” when “[h]e or she intentionally engages in a course of
conduct directed at a family or household member; and [h]e or she knows or reasonably
should know that such conduct is likely to result in substantial power or control over the
family or household member.” Tuerkheimer, supra note 103, at 1019–20. This statute
would require at least two acts of such conduct, and would also constitute the lowest
degree of the offense. Id. at 1020 & n.321.
236 Burke, supra note 22, at 598 & n.252.
237 Id. at 598.
238 Id. at 596, 598.
239 Fuller, supra note 14, at 76–77.
240 Burke, supra note 22, at 605–06.
231

232
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also puts abusers on notice; the combination of that notice and
more accurate prosecutions should help increase the effectiveness
of achieving the societal goals, deterrence and retribution, of
criminalizing domestic violence in the first place.
Additionally, while some might “balk at a requirement
that intentional mens rea be proven with respect to the exercise
of power and control,” it is not “understandabl[e]” nor necessary
to do so.241 If a domestic violence statute is going to have any
effectiveness whatsoever at prosecuting coercive or threatening
speech, then, as the First Amendment demands, prosecutors
must establish a batterer’s subjective intent.242 With a proper
statute, such prosecution is no longer “practically insurmountable”
but becomes the right solution for prosecuting perpetrators of
domestic violence.243 In fact, the strength of the Coercive Domestic
Violence statute is that it purposefully imposes a high mental
state intent requirement.244 The statute would finally enable
jurors, when determining guilt, to focus not merely on the
elements of the crime, but on the intentions of the abuser.245
Professor Burke’s article uses the successes of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act
and stalking statutes to dispel the potential criticism that
criminal law is not suited to address the distinctive features of
intimate partner violence.246 One of the greatest problems of
efforts to “target chronic criminal behavior,” like the RICO and
stalking statutes, is unconstitutional vagueness.247 The Coercive
Domestic Violence statute directly combats this problem by
requiring the government prove a “high,” “concomitant” mental
state of the defendant.248
The Coercive Domestic Violence statute accomplishes
the statutory necessities in other ways as well. One of the most
effective portions of the statute is its definition of “control” and
“pattern of domestic violence,”249 which would play a crucial role
in resolving the existing prosecutorial issues. By laying out that a
“pattern of domestic violence” means “two or more incidents . . . or
any attempts to commit . . . offenses [of existing crimes like
Tuerkheimer, supra note 103, at 1022.
See supra Section II.D.
243 See generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 103, at 1022.
244 Burke, supra note 22, at 605.
245 Id. at 577.
246 Id. at 588–91. For instance, it was ineffective to view stalking behavior in
isolated incidents, as such conduct, often, is not in and of itself criminal behavior and had
to be defined as “a pattern of conduct . . . where the cumulative effect of seemingly
innocuous individual incidents can cause severe emotional distress and fear.” Id. at 589.
247 Id. at 591.
248 Id. at 605.
249 Id. at 602.
241

242
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harassment, assault etc.], committed against the same intimate
partner” the statute facilitates introduction of the contextual
factors of domestic violence to establish intent.250 Further, by
defining the “completed offense” as “the mere attempt to gain
power or control”251 the statute protects the agency of a battered
partner, something Professor Tuerkheimer’s proposed statute also
fails to do.252 By no longer making the victim’s credibility central
to the narrative integrity, the Coercive Domestic Violence statute
protects her from revictimization253 and makes her psychological
state irrelevant to whether the abuser can be charged with the
offense.254 By making their psychological state a nonissue, the
statute removes another barrier to prosecution255 and better
incentivizes women’s participation in the prosecution of their
abusers. 256 All of these effects would alleviate some of the
workload of prosecutors, law enforcement, and the courts. In an
already overburdened criminal justice system, having such a
statute would have critical practical effects in allowing innovative
judicial solutions—like IDV courts and Family Justice Centers—
to be even more effective.
2. The Coercive Domestic Violence Statute Is
Compatible with the True Threat Doctrine, Making
Prosecution of Abusers’ Social Media Threats
Possible
Like cross-burning, sometimes the only message conveyed
through a Facebook post is intimidation.257 The Coercive Domestic
Violence statute would facilitate the distinction between the two.
When Tara Elonis sought a protection-from-abuse order from her
county court, she did so because of the fear she felt from Mr.
Elonis’s Facebook posts. Prior to Tara leaving him, the police
visited the couple’s home several times for domestic
disturbances.258 During the federal trial, she testified that “[she]
felt like [she] was being stalked. [She] felt extremely afraid for

Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 603–04 (emphasis omitted).
252 Id. at 601.
253 Id. at 603.
254 See id. at 605.
255 See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 44, at 187 (explaining that a lack of
victim cooperation is a real issue for prosecutors currently).
256 Burke, supra note 22, at 578.
257 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003).
258 Malone, supra note 6.
250

251
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[her] and [her] children’s and [her] families’ lives.”259 She went
on to testify that the “lyrical” form of these threats did not lessen
her perception of their seriousness.260 Because the government
had to prosecute Mr. Elonis under an interstate communications
statute rather than a specific domestic violence statute, the
government could not distinguish between why Tara’s fear was
different from the fear of the police officer.
There are substantial differences between the speech
within Mr. Elonis’s above post,261 the source of a single charge
against Mr. Elonis, and the posts about law enforcement and
the government. An effective statute must be able to accurately
separate the statements “[f]old up your PFA and put it in your
pocket[,] Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?” an example of
domestic violence, from “I’ve got enough explosives to take care of
the state police and the sheriff’s Department,” an example of
speech potentially protected by the First Amendment.262 The
Coercive Domestic Violence statute enables this critical
separation, while protecting Mr. Elonis’s First Amendment rights,
and facilitates enough contextual factors to establish the requisite
subjective intent to prosecute a true threat.
For example, in October 2010, Mr. Elonis posted on
Facebook that:
There’s one way to love ya but a thousand ways to kill ya,
And I’m not gonna rest until your body is a mess,
Soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts,
Hurry up and die bitch so I can bust this nut,
All over your corpse from atop your shallow grave,
I used to be a nice guy, then you became a slut,
I guess it’s not your fault you liked your daddy raped you,
So hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive you.263

Mr. Elonis defended this post, and his others about
Tara, as artistic, therapeutic expressions through “rap lyrics.”264

259 United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 352 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct.
2001 (2015) (quoting Transcript of Trial at 97, United States v. Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d
335 (2012) (No. 11-13)).
260 Id.
261 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
262 Mr. Elonis posted this on Facebook in response to his wife obtaining a
protection-from-abuse order. Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 7–8.
263 In October 2010, Anthony Elonis posted this to Facebook. Id. at 4.
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He testified that these posts “help[ed] [him] deal with the pain.”265
In so testifying, however, when viewed contextually with the
timing of, the public nature of, and the disclaimers about the
posts, Mr. Elonis admitted that he intentionally posted about
Tara because of the intimidating effect it would have on her.
Mr. Elonis had a greater awareness than mere negligence
in the effect the posts would have on Tara.266 While one may
certainly cathartically and privately compose a poem or rap
lyrics, Tara testified that she never once, during their seven
years of marriage, saw Mr. Elonis write rap lyrics.267 The fact
that Mr. Elonis began composing these “rap lyrics” after Tara
left him and removed their children, and on a public forum is
evidence that this was his attempt to reassert authority and
power in their relationship. Had Mr. Elonis used this public
form of expression prior to Tara leaving, this conclusion would
be illogical. Yet, there was something novel for Mr. Elonis about
composing these rap lyrics and posting them at a venue where
all of her friends and family could see. There was something that
helped him “deal with the pain”268 about telling Tara, in front of
her entire world, that the only way he could “forgive” her, was to
kill her, defile her corpse, and publically shame her.269 Mr.
Elonis also repeatedly disclaimed his right to communicate in
this manner,270 not only taunting Tara, but further acknowledging
his awareness of the effect that these messages would have on
her. When one views all of these contextual factors together, the
message is no longer an innocuous, albeit graphic, post venting
about the frustrations of a divorce. Rather, the message Mr.
Elonis repeatedly and intentionally sent to his intimate partner
was an intimidating threat.
Under the Coercive Domestic Violence statute, advocates
would be able to use this kind of testimony to prove intent
because the statute combines the abuser’s intent with the
contextual reality of multiple harms that domestic violence
victims experience. Abusers abuse, through physical violence,
isolation, or posting threatening comments on social media,
because of a need to assert power and control over their intimate

264 On Facebook, Mr. Elonis explained his threats with “I’m doing this for me.
My writing is therapeutic.” Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005 (2015).
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Elonis, 730 F.3d at 325 (citing Transcript of Trial at 97, United States v.
Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3798)).
268 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
269 Brief for the United States, supra note 5, at 4.
270 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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partner.271 And their reactions when their victims attempt to
regain control—when they feel that control slipping away—are
to reassert that control forcefully.272
Under the Coercive Domestic Violence statute, Mr.
Elonis had the requisite intent necessary for these particular
posts to Tara to be deemed an attempt “to gain power or control
over an intimate partner through a pattern of domestic violence,”273
constituting a true threat and thus being prosecutable speech. He
would still lack the requisite intent, as currently defined by the
Court, to be prosecuted for his posts about his coworkers and
government officials. The Coercive Domestic Violence statute
would thus only criminalize the portion of his speech that was
threatening to his intimate partner, striking the necessary
constitutional balance between protecting his First Amendment
rights and those of Tara. This statute is the solution for
resolving the prosecutorial and constitutional difficulties created
by the interaction of the Constitution, domestic violence, and
social media.
CONCLUSION
Threats—especially those made by an abuser to his
intimate partner—cannot have “pride of place among [ ] protected
speech.”274 While Elonis could have provided federal courts with
much-needed guidance as to what level of mens rea the
government must establish and the proper objective and
subjective standards to use, the government would still have
the same prosecutorial issues underlying domestic violence. The
difficulty with prosecuting perpetrators of domestic violence does
not stem from the First Amendment or the “true threat” doctrine,
but from the use of transaction-bound statutes that were not
designed to criminalize what is criminal about domestic violence.
Rather, the solution is a reliable, straightforward, narrow statute
that specifically prosecutes perpetrators of domestic violence
and strikes a balance between an abuser’s First Amendment
rights and a victim’s right to be protected from harm and coercion.
The Coercive Domestic Violence statute is that solution. It
prevents an abuser from being able to “hid[e] behind his [internet
persona]”275 yet requires a high enough mens rea to distinguish
271
272
273
274
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between a true threat and an abuser’s protected speech. Rather
than threaten advocacy of victims of gender-based violence, highprofile decisions like Elonis have propelled the inadequacies of
existing domestic violence laws into the national spotlight.
Reformists need to capitalize on that momentum and ride this
new “wave of more transformative reform” until Congress enacts
the domestic violence specific statute we so desperately need.276
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